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Another Year of Shame for Britain’s Farming,
Food, and Countryside
VEGA NEWS Number 9 revealed last February
the appalling rates of morbidity and mortality in a normal
year in the sheep industry, notably in lambing in the unequal
conditions in the aptly-named less favoured areas (LFAs).
The year 2001 opened with another disaster in this deplorable
industry. Before the Government had had time to complete its
commentary on the report produced by the BSE Inquiry (which
cost taxpayers £27 million), a national epidemic of
foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) erupted. Smaller outbreaks affected
France and the Netherlands. Once again bad husbandry and serious
lapses in biosecurity were revealed. Subsequent issues of
VEGA NEWS commented on them. Now we can amplify the story.
History
Britain had had a long history of foot and mouth disease
(FMD) up to 1967/68. Outbreaks had been reported in every
year from 1918 to 1959, with a mean of over 100 a year in
the 1950s. The number of outbreaks reported in each of the
years from 1960 to 1967 was 298, 103, 5, 0, 0, 1, 34 and 2210,
respectively. FMD was frequently imported into Great Britain
before 1967 and as frequently eradicated by a slaughter policy
without recourse to vaccination. The 1967 outbreak and the
appalling massacre of farm animals and the pyres in which
they were incinerated shocked the nation, and in 1968 the
Northumberland Report recommended changes in the UK’s
meat import policy that, when implemented, contributed to
the country’s 33 years’ freedom from FMD, except
for a single outbreak in the Isle of Wight in 1981, attributed
to an airborne transmission of virus from Brittany.
“Thus, the levels of awareness and understanding of
FMD were very different between the two epidemics and the
risk of failing to detect disease in 2001 was much greater,”
state commentators of the State Veterinary Service (Veterinary
Record 05 January 2002). VEGA is surprised that the origins
and fluctuations of flu and tuberculosis in the human population
did not prompt unease in MAFF over lapses in biosecurity over
outbreaks and epidemics of viral and bacterial (and, latterly,
prion) diseases in populations of farm (and wild) animals,
which heavily outnumber human kind. Nor were the malign influences,
common to all the species, of crowding, stress, bad hygiene,
and lack of care appreciated. The farmers’ and dealers’
malpractices were connived at; vets could resort to a remedy
denied to doctors – slaughtering-out policies denying
the ailing (and even only susceptible) patients care and cure
by culling them. Kill or cure translates to kill, kill, kill…
Cost Cutting Connivance, Catastrophe
Two years ago an editorial commentary (Veterinary Record
29 April 2000) appraised the MAFF’s “tight”
financial position. “From an estimated outturn of around
£480 million in 1999/2000 MAFF intended that expenditure
by the Animal Health and Veterinary Group should fall to about
£370m in 2000/1, rising only slightly to about £380m
2001/2. Meanwhile, it is disappointing that, despite the fact
that one of MAFF’s top 10 stated objectives is ‘to
ensure that farmed animals and fish are protected by high
animal welfare standards and do not suffer unnecessary pain
or distress’, spending in this area is set to decrease
– from £7.7m in 1999/2000 to £7.4m in 2000/1
and 2001/2”. The State Veterinary Service (SVS) and veterinary
laboratory services have been reduced, and the country’s
Chief Vet has just admitted, as the year 2001 closed, that
at times the demands of the latest epidemic of FMD overwhelmed
the veterinary resources he could muster.
VEGA NEWS 13 and a full statement on its website have conveyed
to the Government’s Commission on Farming and Food its
indictment of the nation’s cheap food policies and has
signalled the opportunities for urgent and overdue salutary
reform. Whether or not we buy or consume meat, milk, poultry,
fish, eggs, wool, or leather and their derivatives, we (and
this includes, through CAP policies, other European nations)
are accomplices by the taxes we pay, our choice of politicians,
and the education and example we set our children for the
grants and subsidies that support and continue ruinous practices
in farming and food production.
FMD rapidly reached its height in March 2001. The epidemic
seemed to be out of control, notwithstanding dubious assurances
from ministers and harassed veterinary advisers to MAFF, which
was itself culled subsequently and replaced with a body with
a new name—but little restocked with human livestock—called
DEFRA (the Dept of the Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs).
Gone were the Fs for Farming and Fisheries.
Once again Britain’s farming and food industries suffered
further losses in confidence and reputation as gigantic pyres
of dead animals whose smoke billowed over the countryside
gave the world more pictures of live/dead stock farming in
parlous disarray.
The countryside was closed. Ramblers were denied passage
on footpaths even in counties where no cases had been reported.
Tourist attractions and accommodation from hotels to B &
B’s closed or were bankrupted, joining the farmers’
constant refrains for subsidies and grants to recoup losses
incurred by pursuit of appalling farming policies and depletion
over recent years of the State Veterinary Service to such
a low level that its officers could not cope with the challenges
of disease and welfare control it faced. It was fortunate
for the Food Standards Agency that FMD is a zoonosis that
doesn’t affect people. It could have been much worse:
there are zoonotic viruses around with lethal consequences
for people that could spread as FMD did. Right royal repercussions
reverberated through the realm: FMD was blamed by Royal Collection
Enterprises for a 20% fall in profits generated by the Queen’s
palaces: visitors’ numbers fell last year by 189,000
from 2000 to 1.7 million. Farmers were marooned behind disinfectant
barriers at their gates. The countryside under siege reeked
of disinfectant; a suggestion was made at one time to spray
whole areas from the air with disinfectant.
The epidemic was ruthlessly slaughtered out, and by the end
of September the policy of massacre seemed to have overcome
the immediate threat. Cumbria suffered the worst of the counties
with 893 outbreaks of FMD. Many Lakeland hillsides are now
bare of the “little fluffy bundles.” Of the abutting
counties Dumfries and Galloway had 176 cases, North Yorks
134, Co Durham 93, and Northumberland 87. In the South, Devon
had 173 outbreaks, and another area of acute hardship ran
along the Welsh border.
Telling The Toll
The toll of slaughtered animals amounts to 3,992,000 –
nearly 4 million – of which 3,248,000 were sheep, 598,000
cattle, 142,000 pigs, 2,000 goats, and 1,000 deer, all burnt
or consigned to hastily dug pits in a countryside increasingly
embarrassed by resources for land-fill.
The government had incurred corresponding expenses during
the single year of £2.7 billion – that’s nearly
£50 from each one of us. Much of this - £1.25bn
– has been paid as compensation to farmers for infected
animals that were destroyed. Another £701m was the cost
of eradicating the disease through slaughter, cleansing, and
disinfection, £471m went to farmers having to dispose
of uninfected animals, £54m was granted for the recovery
of rural businesses, £18m for promotions of tourism,
£15m on advice to farmers, and £4m to the cost
of reopening footpaths. The farming industry has suffered
in other ways, e.g. in restricted marketing and sales, and
the NFU, never at a loss for further subventions, puts its
bids for more compensations at just under £1bn. The
English Tourist Council has weighed in with claims for uncompensated
losses of spending at the rate of 6%, amounting to £1.4bn
in the first half of the year and another £1.7bn in
the second. Wales and Scotland have suffered big losses too.
These are hefty raids on the nation’s coffers and come
on top of losses due to BSE and vCJD, with no prospect of
early cessation. The government has responded rapidly by setting
up 3 inquiries into the outbreaks and their consequences and
the need for reforming policies, if only to staunch the drain
on the Exchequer and to regain confidence in Britain’s
farming, food, science and health. However it’s an ill
wind…. Greater recognition has been gained in the aftermath
of these tragedies, which have recurred over many years, for
reforming Green Plan policies, which VEGA is protesting vigorously
in officially sought testimony. In the short-term at least
ousting of abuses in the transport and marketing of farm animals
will be curtailed, and customers will reduce their demands
sufficiently to remove any justification for replacements
of animal-derived products from within or without the EU.
The Start
On Monday, 19 February 2001, the Official Veterinary Surgeon
(OVS) at a slaughterhouse in Brentford, Essex, noticed in
the course of his duties for the Meat Hygiene Service (MHS)
lameness in 27 sows at the antemortem veterinary inspection.
(This is a slaughterhouse notable for collecting sows and
boars, particularly “spent” breeding stock whose
meat won’t sell in the UK, to be killed for material
more esteemed in continental Europe for manufacturing into
sausages, e.g. in Germany). The OVS duly reported his suspicions
of a vesicular disease that he couldn’t identify with
certainty (he had never seen a case of FMD), but he brought
all killing at the slaughterhouse to a halt. A government-employed
veterinary officer, in a confirmatory examination of the 109
pigs on the premises remaining alive, found disease suspicious
of FMD in 28 of them. Initial laboratory tests were positive;
FMD was finally confirmed the next day.
The affected pigs originated from 3 sources in locations
in Buckinghamshire, Isle of Wight, and Yorkshire. The oldest
lesions seen were probably 5 days old when the pigs were examined
on 20 February. These symptoms were also seen on both groups
of pigs entered on 16 February; younger lesions were discovered
on pigs that had arrived on 18 February.
Urgent tracing was instigated, but the State Veterinary Service
(SVS) failed to find evidence of FMD in their inspections
of the 3 putative source farms. This fact and the estimated
age of the lesions suggested that infection in the pigs from
these farms had occurred after arrival at the slaughterhouse.
Consequently SVSs visited all (approximately 600) premises
that had supplied livestock to the slaughterhouse during the
previous 2 weeks. Priority was given to premises where swill
feeding was practised.
The trail got hot when an SVS inspection found FMD on a swill-fed,
pig-fattening unit in Northumberland. This farm had sent 35
sows to the Essex slaughterhouse; they had arrived at midnight
on 15/16 February and were slaughtered the following morning.
No other possible source of infection for the abattoir was
found, after intensive visiting and searching. Investigations
are continuing, but the likeliest source is waste food contaminated
with FMD virus. This deduction is described in a paper on
the Descriptive Epidemiology of the 2001 FMD epidemic in Great
Britain: the first five months (Veterinary Record, 15 December
2001), which abounds in proof of the allegations of evils
in the live/dead stock industry to which VEGA’s investigations
and testimony have borne witness over many years. The account
alludes to violations of regulations on farming, hygiene,
and animal welfare, some of which are currently causes for
litigation. Animal welfarists will read into the details many
reasons for preventing a return to the wheeling and dealing
of the old days as the restrictions imposed as a result of
BSE and FMD are lifted.
Tracking
Investigators found “widespread lameness” at the
“unit” in Northumberland and estimated that “approximately
90% of the 527 pigs on the farm had lesions suggestive FMD.
Many pigs had lameness of up to all four feet, often with
separation of old horn from the underlying tissue. Vesicles
were found on the snouts of some pigs and it was from these
that FMD virus of an identical strain to that found at the
Essex abattoir was recovered. The oldest lesions on this farm
were estimated to be 12 days old when examined on February
24”. (A lesion is a broad term describing a wound, sore,
ulcer, tumour, cataract or other damage to tissue. The definition’s
range includes skin sores associated with eczema to the changes
in lung tissue that occur in tuberculosis. A vesicle is a
small bladder or sac containing liquid, a blister; vesicular
disease includes a group of highly infective outcomes, including
FMD, in cloven-footed animals). The telephone report indicated
that pigs for slaughter from this farm were sent only to the
Essex abattoir. The previous shipment of 50 sows and one boar
had taken place earlier, on 08 February. The abattoir did
not slaughter over the weekend, “so pigs arriving late
on a Friday or over the weekend were laired until Monday.
No clinical signs of disease were seen in pigs slaughtered
on Monday, February 12, some of which had been laired over
the weekend”. (A lairage should comprise facilities at
saleyards or slaughterhouses, including loading ramps, laneways,
drafting races, branding and injection chutes, weighing equipment,
holding pens, covered housing, waterpoints, and feed bunkers).
Direct spread of disease by aerosol or fomites from the Northumberland
unit, the fourth to be identified (as IP2001/04), probably
led to at least 14 of the 70 cases identified to date in that
group. Further infection from these has been largely limited
to the county of Northumberland; however, one of these infected
premises, the sixth to be identified (on 23 February), as
(IP 2001/06) furnished confirmation of a private vet’s
report of FMD in cattle. This farm had sent to market on 13
February sheep incubating FMD and excreting virus. On 23 February
up to 50% of the housed cattle herd on IP2001/06 had vesicular
mouth lesions. At that time no obvious clinical disease had
been noticed in the sheep; however, on 12 February a group
of 27 sheep had been housed in a shed near the cattle with
the oldest lesions (reckoned on 25 February as being 9 days
old).
(Fomites are inanimate objects or materials on which disease-producing
agents may be conveyed, e.g. faeces, bedding, or harness).
Pigs, Sheep, Cattle
Sheep and cattle now come significantly into the picture.
Sixteen of the sheep on IP2001/06, together with 3 from the
owner’s other premises, were sent to Hexham market in
Northumberland on 13 February. The owner reported that the
group had had two episodes of lameness requiring footbath
treatment on 10 and 20 February. The eleven remaining sheep
from this group at slaughter on 25 February manifested healing
foot lesions “suggestive of FMD in five, and all eleven
were seropositive for FMD. It is therefore likely that these
sheep were infected concurrently with, or earlier than, the
affected cattle. None of the other 339 sheep on the premises
was close to the affected cattle or showed clinical or post-mortem
evidence of disease”. Mathematical modelling of wind-borne
spread of FMD virus from IP 2001/04 showed that IP 2001/06,
8 km north east away, lay under the relevant virus plume.
Accumulated evidence indicated that sheep from IP2001/06
were the source of widespread dissemination of FMD in the
UK. Onward tracing showed that the group was split at Hexham
market and sold to two dealers (16 sheep) and a local butcher
(3 sheep). One dealer sent the six sheep he had bought back
to his home farm in Lancashire, where FMD was confirmed on
27 February; the second dealer sent his 10 bought sheep, together
with 174 others bought on 13 February at Hexham market, for
sale at Longtown market in Cumbria, on 15 February. “Thereafter
infection was spread either by infected animals or through
contamination of vehicles and people in this initial transmission
phase. The bulk of infected animals passing through markets
went through the markets held at Longtown; some infected sheep
passed through more than one market. Examination of Longtown
market’s sales records over the period of February 14
to 23 showed that at least 24,500 sheep entered the markets
and could have been exposed to infection. Tracing of 181 Longtown
purchasers began on February 25 and by March 5, the tracing
of more than 100,000 sheep moved through markets was underway”,
states the report.
Statistics on the spread of infection by personnel and vehicles
are incomplete; however, movements of infected animals out
of Longtown market accounted directly for the infection of
at least 25 holdings, including 8 dealers’ premises and
2 slaughterhouses. “The farms were local, in Cumbria
or the neighbouring county of Dumfries and Galloway. The dealers
originated from these 2 counties and from Devon, County Durham,
Herefordshire, and Lancashire; the slaughterhouses were in
Wales (Anglesey) and County Durham”. The markets most
implicated in the spread of FMD before 23 February 2001 were
at Hexham, Longtown, Welshpool, Hereford, Ross, and Northampton.
On 23 February nationwide restrictions were introduced on
movements of farm animals, indicating the harm done at markets
and slaughterhouses and by dealers in the spread of the disease.
Movement of infected animals (mainly sheep) before the imposition
of national movement controls was “directly responsible
for the introduction of infection into at least 9 of the 12
major geographical groups of cases that were defined during
the course of the epidemic. Eight of these areas, which account
for 89% of the cases diagnosed before 15 July, were infected
before the first case of FMD was diagnosed.”
Pestilence Spreads
FMD was introduced into mid-Wales when ewes destined for
Welshpool market were transported there in a contaminated
lorry that had carried infected sheep from Longtown market
the previous day. A primary source of infection for the North
Yorkshire cluster has yet to be identified. The East Lancashire
group is most likely to have been infected by local spread
from the Settle sub-group in North Yorks, “although the
precise means of transmission have not been determined”.
Farms and dealers in Staffordshire received infected sheep
from Longtown and Hexham markets and infected cattle from
Northampton market. The Durham cluster was associated with
one infected dealer and 2 infected slaughterhouses. Infected
slaughterhouses were the main sources for the groups of cases
in Anglesey, Essex, and Kent and Yorkshire and Lancashire
groups, and for the Wiltshire cluster. In Hereford transmission
was augmented by further distribution of infected livestock
at the market.
Between 20 February and 15 July 1853 holdings in the UK were
confirmed as infected with FMD. Four were in Northern Ireland;
interesting as these are, we have to wait for further intelligence
before we can comment on them. The size of the whole epidemic
up to 15 July was heavily influenced by the outbreak in the
Cumbria group (in which Longtown market was located), which
accounted for 52% of all cases reported during this time.
“All livestock, vehicles, and personnel that passed through
the market after infection was introduced were traced and
holdings visited. However, due to further sales or exchange
of animals after the official market, an unknown number of
animal movements were not recorded. Sheep were not individually
identified, which meant that it was not possible to trace
and cull all potentially infected sheep”, explains the
report, emphasizing the difficulties in tracing sheep from
fork back to farm.
Factors
The report attributes the large scale of the 2001 epidemic
to a variety of factors, such as:
- The delay between the introduction of disease to the
country and its notification to the SVS
- The susceptibility of sheep to the pan-Asiatic type O
FMD virus strain and the difficulty of clinically detecting
FMD in sheep
- The time of the year when FMD virus was introduced. It
coincided with one of the peaks in the number of sheep passing
through livestock markets and provided weather conditions
in which the virus could persist.
- The marketing of infected sheep before FMD infection had
been disclosed in the country.
- The sheer size of the sheep population, the increasing
numbers of holdings with sheep in recent years and the high
frequency of sheep movements
The factors resulted in many initially undetected secondary
sources of infection across sheep-dense areas of England,
Wales, and southern Scotland. These were equivalent in effect
to multiple primary cases of FMD that propagated the epidemic
locally for days before the first case was diagnosed. VEGA
emphasizes the difficulty in diagnosis of the disease in sheep,
because the national flock is afflicted with ailments as lamentable
as those associated with Dolly, The Clone.
“Infected sheep are often difficult to detect particularly
when the disease is in its early stages; it presents as lameness
which, as veterinarians will know, is a common condition at
this time of the year.” The disease is FMD. The commentator
is Gareth Davies, a vet of Woking, Surrey (Veterinary Record,
24 March 2001).
Sheep on the Move
The sheep industry in Great Britain (comprising 39 million
sheep held on 75,360 premises) “depends upon movements
of sheep. Lambs for slaughter often pass through markets and
travel distances of up to 600 km; about two-thirds travel
an average of 80 km (50 miles) and the remainder travel an
average of 430km. Fat sheep are often kept on distant lowland
pastures or indoors over the winter months, after which they
are moved (often through a market) to farms where they are
fattened for a period before slaughter. In addition farmers
may buy cull ewes to meet European Union subsidy targets that
focus on this particular time of the year.” VEGA NEWS
has carried warnings of the persistent evils in the sheep
industry, which were causing suffering and death before FMD
struck. Journeys could be extended for transhipments of animals
far into continental Europe, e.g. of frail, “light”
lambs from less favoured areas in Wales that have not suited
tastes and butchers in Britain, but are esteemed for their
meat in countries such as Greece, especially for celebrations
of Easter.
If the primary introduction of infection had been in December
2000, the probability of infected animals being sent to market
would have been much lower, and the epidemic might have been
restricted to Essex and Northumberland, amounting to a total
of 86 cases or less. FMD virus had already been widely disseminated
throughout Great Britain before the first diagnosis was made.
Existing enabling legislation permitted imposition of immediate
movement restrictions on the holding and the surrounding area
as soon as FMD was suspected, which controlled the size of
the epidemic in the Essex area. “The feeding of swill
is a known risk factor for the introduction of infections
such as FMD, and the targeting of such farms in initial tracing
activities resulted in the discovery of probable index cases
within 2 days. Imposition of nationwide livestock movement
restrictions under the Animal Health Act within 3 days of
the first diagnosis undoubtedly reduced the potential scale
of the epidemic”, declares the report, anticipating much
further enquiry and controversy over the handling and prevention
of this epidemic and comparisons with precedents in the UK
and overseas.
Before confirmation of FMD 335 livestock markets took place
in Great Britain each week. Many of them sold sheep; as reported
in earlier issues of VEGA NEWS animal welfarists monitored
and recorded activities on-site and the corollaries. (A scientific
report funded by VEGA is in press in a veterinary journal
assessing faults and bad practice in 12 markets dealing in
cattle; a pre-publication copy of this report has been sent
to the Farm Animal Welfare Council, which requested it).
The locations of most infected animals were not known when
the first cases was confirmed; locations of subsequent outbreaks
show that the majority were outside the existing restricted
areas and infected animals “could thus have been moved
and traded through markets,” comment the authors of the
paper in the Veterinary Record.
The report comments that “the speed of imposition of
movement restrictions both locally and nationally contrasts
favourably with similar action attempted in the 1997 Taiwan
epidemic, in which over 6000 farms were infected. Movements
of livestock (pigs) off individual IPs were restricted a day
after the first case was confirmed, although the authorities
were never able to shut down livestock markets. This omission
was believed to be a major contributor to the rapid spread
of disease. In contrast, only two markets (Oswestry and Kendal)
were suspected of involvement in the 1967/68 outbreak in England,
and this suspicion was ruled out when animals which had been
through the markets failed to develop disease. The absence
of markets as a disseminator of infection in the 1967/68 epidemic
limited the area of the country affected. During that epidemic,
livestock movement restrictions were applied over a radius
of about 10 miles around each IP when disease was suspected,
and over the areas in which livestock from two suspected markets
had been distributed. Similar restrictions were extended to
cover all of England and Wales 3 weeks after the first case
was confirmed and to Scotland a week later.
Nationwide restriction remained in place for 2½ months.
The epidemic had already started to wane when widespread restrictions
were imposed, and cases had already been detected in all 5
major areas affected. Thus local movement restrictions were
already in place and the addition of nationwide controls may
not have changed the course of the 1967/68 epidemic”.
Seasons and Sales
Seasonal farming practices may have triggered the late cluster
of cases in North Yorkshire in 2001. “Extensive routine
movements of agricultural personnel and machinery between
separate plots of land and in overwintering populations of
sheep elsewhere are among common seasonal farming practices.
Most sheep flocks in the area begin lambing from April onwards,
which is about the time disease erupted in the Settle area.
“Whether this was due to lambing precipitating existing
disease, the inevitable increased contact, or the introduction
of disease through these movements is the subject of current
investigations”, the account reports. In general the
east of Great Britain remained free of disease, “possibly
because it has a higher proportion of arable land and is not
involved in specialist store lamb or ewe finishing. Further
work is needed to investigate the role of the differences
in geography, local farming practices, and specific control
measures in the scale and distribution of the epidemic.
In 86% of confirmed cases during the relevant period sheep
were present on the premises; which is consistent with the
view that the initial dissemination of infection was confined
to sheep. It contrasts with the type O Taiwan strain of FMD
virus involved in the Taiwan epidemic, where ruminants were
not affected, even though they were present on infected pig-farms.
The disease is clinically more apparent in pigs and cattle
than in sheep. Relative risk can be difficult to determine
owing to the problem of defining the sheep population at risk.
It proved hard in 2001 in the UK to know the whereabouts of
many sheep. The presence on a holding of sheep that are not
in the ownership of the main occupier is not recorded in the
data in the agricultural census (the main source of information
on livestock populations and distribution in Great Britain).
Many farmers rent out land for grazing sheep, particularly
in the winter months and in the areas where the highest incidence
of FMD occurred. “It may also be the case that having
sheep is a proxy measure of increased inter-farm movements”,
observes the report.
Early in the year many sheep are on pasture that will be
grazed by cattle when the latter are let out in April and
May. If the sheep are infected there is then a risk of outbreaks
in cattle either from direct contact with sheep or with pasture
and equipment contaminated by sheep. (The virus can survive
for months in the environment). Such disease may remain undetected
until cattle are exposed to infection, for example, when they
leave their winter housing. As the FMD epidemic progressed
the observed incidence of disease in cattle increased, possibly
as a consequence of these factors. Disease is more easily
detected in cattle, both because of greater exhibition of
clinical signs and because they are likely to be observed
more frequently. Further, many sheep within the areas of greatest
risk were culled, so any remaining infection would be encountered
by other species, which would most commonly be cattle.
Species and Susceptibility
Most pig farms have been spared in the epidemic, owing, at
least in part, to their concentration in the east of the country,
most of which has remained uninfected. Moreover, the movement
of pigs is more closely controlled than that of other livestock,
biosecurity tends to be tighter on pig-farms (because scourges
such as classical swine fever sweep through this intensified
industry), and farm-to-farm trading of pigs is uncommon. Legislation
exists to prohibit movement of pigs off a farm within 20 days
of the movement of any pigs on that farm and to prevent swill-fed
pigs from being moved other than to slaughter”. These
controls, together with the pre-emptive slaughter of exposed
pigs in infected areas will have limited the number of cases
in pigs. On most IPs with pigs the pigs had shown no evidence
of disease. The usually rapid detection of disease on IPs
will have reduced the potential for development of disease
in any other species on the farm. Pigs are further protected
by their relative resistance to infection by aerosols”,
concludes the report.
Goats are less likely than other stock to be on temporary
grazing, and the frequency of goats in IPs (5%), whether infected
or healthy, was similar to their recorded frequency of 7%
on livestock holdings in both the northern Infected Area and
in the whole population.
The location of the primary introduction of FMD virus has
been identified in 8 geographic areas; only one of these premises
was a farm. “The importance of other types of premises,
such as dealers, markets, and abattoirs in the dissemination
of infection is not surprising, given the current structure
of the livestock industry. Such premises have multiple movements
of animals on and off, so the risk of introduction and dissemination
is much higher. This observation highlights potential targets
for future surveillance and disease control measures to reduce
the risk of a similar epidemic in future”, states the
epidemiological report of the first 5 months of the epidemic
of FMD in Great Britain in 2001.
The authors of the report are highly qualified scientists
and epidemiologists in the State Veterinary Service and the
Veterinary Laboratories Agency, as well as in the Dept of
Infectious and Tropical Diseases, School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine, University of London.
What Now……
Farmers are urging the British Government to resist restrictions
on livestock movements that the EU is trying to enforce. The
Government must acknowledge the outrage that attaches to transhipments
of live sheep and the incompetence of EU authorities to enforce
regulations on animal welfare. The British public will surely
object if British farmers and Government aid and abet this
trade, becoming accomplices in a disreputable resumption and
in overcoming reluctance in many countries after BSE and FMD
to accept any livestock from the UK.
Animal welfarists and many farmers would welcome an injunction
from the British Government at least to halt transhipments
of British sheep, directly or indirectly, to France to be
slaughtered by the illicit (according to EU regulations) practices
in public celebrations of Muslim Eid festivals.
Lambing has been continued in the usual seasonal way in the
UK, with all its harm to the animals’ welfare. Livestock
farmers are pressing on with restocking depleted herds and
flocks. This is a time when alien afflictions and susceptibilities
may be introduced into breeding enterprises and then transmitted
nationally. We expect the Government’s Commission on
Policy for Farming and Food to report on 29 January. It should
insist at least on rigorous – and costly (to the industry
and, ultimately, consumers) – overhaul of the traceability
and trading of livestock, final closure of swill-farms, and
reinforced powers for SVS and Environmental Health, and Trading
Standards Officers (EHOs and TSOs).
Farmers have blamed lapses in controls of imported foods
for letting FMD into Britain. Certainly some hitherto unexposed
malpractices have been revealed, but it is futile to expect
Customs, EHOs, and TSOs to be able to shut out all contraband,
whether of counterfeit goods, drugs, cigarettes, or contaminated
food. It would be fairly easy for an evildoer to insinuate
FMD to start another outbreak and spread. If there is a next
time, the live/dead stock industry, and their customers and
insurers must foot the bill without recourse to the Treasury
to bail them out of their crassness. Consumers must know –
or be able to know – where their meat comes from; farmers
must know where their animals go to as leave the farm to go
“down the road” to their death.
And this traceability must not be achieved by festooning
live animals with identity tags dangling dangerously and inviting
injury. It is the whole absurd industry that is due for the
cull.
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